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Abstract
The ﬁrst step in designing effective policies to stabilize an economy is to understand business
cycles. No country is isolated from the world economy and external shocks are becoming
increasingly important. The author documents the sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in
22 emerging-market countries, and measures two speciﬁc shocks that could be transmitted from
one country to another: a world real output shock and a world real interest rate shock. Her analysis
shows that there are major differences in the transmission mechanism across emerging-market
countries. To assess whether they are due to different economic structures or to the exchange rate
regime, she divides the sample into groups of countries. The results indicate that the exchange rate
regime is a critical factor, although restrictions on capital ﬂows also play a crucial role. The author
also shows that regional groups and trade openness do not play as important a role as the
exchange rate regime and capital ﬂows in determining the transmission of business cycles.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, F02, E61, E30
Bank classification: International topics; Exchange rate regimes; Transmission of monetary policy
Résumé
Pour élaborer des politiques efﬁcaces et stabilisatrices, il importe d’abord de comprendre le cycle
économique. Aucun pays n’est coupé de l’économie mondiale, et les chocs externes ont
aujourd’hui une inﬂuence de plus en plus grande. L’auteure examine les sources des ﬂuctuations
macroéconomiques qu’ont connues 22 pays à marché émergent. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à
deux chocs mondiaux dont les effets sont susceptibles de se propager entre pays : une variation de
la production réelle et une modiﬁcation des taux d’intérêt réels. Son analyse révèle que le
mécanisme de transmission présente des différences importantes d’une économie émergente à
l’autre. Aussi l’auteure divise-t-elle son échantillon de pays en plusieurs groupes aﬁn d’établir si
ces différences sont attribuables à la structure économique des pays étudiés ou à leur régime de
change. Ses résultats indiquent que le choix du régime de change est crucial, encore que les
restrictions ﬁxées aux mouvements de capitaux jouent également un rôle déterminant. L’étude
montre par ailleurs que les blocs régionaux et l’ouverture des échanges sont des facteurs
relativement moins importants dans la transmission des ﬂuctuations cycliques que le régime de
change et les mouvements de capitaux.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E32, F02, E61, E30
Classification de la Banque : Questions internationales; Régimes de taux de change; Transmission
de la politique monétaire1
1. Introduction
The ﬁrst step in designing effective policies to stabilize an economy is to understand business
cycles (Lucas 1977). The central stylized fact of an international business cycle is that when one
country’s output is above (below) its trend, the output of many other countries also tends to be
above (below) their trend. No country is isolated from the world economy and external shocks are
becoming increasingly important. With the accelerating pace of globalization, the question of how
different countries react to different shocks has gained heightened signiﬁcance.
The study of co-movement, or integration, is important because its results can guide policy in an
era of accelerating globalization. This paper identiﬁes the channels of business cycle transmission
to evaluate the extent to which economic ﬂuctuations in the emerging-market (EM) countries are
caused by shocks that originate in industrialized countries.
The paper documents the sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in EM countries (focusing on
Asia and Latin America) by measuring the relative importance of domestic and external shocks.
Previous studies have typically examined only industrialized countries. Although there is no a
priori reason to believe that business cycles are transmitted differently to industrialized and EM
countries, there could be interesting differences in the way EM countries import business cycle
disturbances. The reults of this study on EM countries could help policy-makers design more
appropriate policies for those countries. For example, this paper helps explain the relative
importance of the different shocks that drive output and real exchange rate ﬂuctuations in EM
countries. Consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model, two speciﬁc shocks are measured that
could be transmitted from one country to another: a world real output shock and a world real
interest rate shock. To assess whether the discrepancies in the transmission of shocks among
countries is due to different economic structures or to the exchange rate regime, this paper divides
the sample into groups of countries, based on the region to which a country belongs, its openness
to trade, its exchange rate regime, and its capital ﬂows.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, country characteristics are used to
determine the source of the divergent responses to shocks for the different EM countries. Second,
the sample analyzed contains 22 EM countries, considerably more than is typically found in the
literature.1 Third, this paper treats world variables as being exogenous, considering all EM
countries to be small open economies.
1. For example, Hoffmaister and Roldós (1996) examine the case of Brazil and Korea, Kydland and
Zarazaga (1997) analyze the case of Argentina, and Rodriguez-Mata (1997) studies economic
ﬂuctuations inCosta Rica.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 presents the empirical framework and section 4 provides details on the data and the
speciﬁcation of the model. Section 5 summarizes the results and presents the different groups of
countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
There is a substantial literature on the transmission of business cycles. As well, the idea that
ﬂuctuations in the developing South are caused largely by shocks that originate in the
industrialized North is widely studied in the traditional North–South literature. The basis of the
argument is that the South specializes in the production of primary goods and therefore relies on
the North for its manufactured goods and for demand for its primary output. Kouparitsas (1996)
builds a general-equilibrium model of North–South trade and ﬁnds that it contains a strong
mechanism for the transmission of business cycles from one region to the other. In his model,
70 per cent of the variation in Southern consumption is caused by Northern aggregate output.
The most commonly used empirical framework in the literature is a small open-economy version
of the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).
The SVAR model adds economic restrictions to an otherwise statistical model to identify the
sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. SVARs are widely used, because they provide an
appropriate framework in which to examine the transmission of shocks. Researchers can identify
the relevant shocks and describe the response of the system to shocks by analyzing impulse
responses (the propagation mechanism of the shocks) as well as variance decompositions.
Using the empirical framework identiﬁed above, Hoffmaister and Roldós (1997) compare
business cycles in Asia and in Latin America using panel data. They conﬁrm the stylized facts
that earlier studies have found for the U.S. economy: the main source of output ﬂuctuations is
domestic supply shocks, even in the short run.2 External factors account for approximately
20 per cent of output movements. Hoffmaister and Roldós also conclude that, in Latin America,
external shocks (particularly world interest rate shocks3) and demand shocks affect output
ﬂuctuations more than in Asia.
Other studies analyze stylized features of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. For example, Agénor,
McDermott, and Prasad (2000) ﬁnd that there are many similarities between macroeconomic
2. Similar conclusions are reached inHoffmaister and Roldós (1996), which analyzes Brazil and Korea.
3. This is consistent with the important role that Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994) assign to world
interest rate shocks.3
ﬂuctuations in EM and industrialized countries, as well as important differences. Some of the
studies focus on speciﬁc stylized facts and then construct theoretical models that can replicate
those facts; e.g., Kydland and Zarazaga’s (1997) work on Argentina and Rodriguez-Mata’s (1997)
analysis of ﬂuctuations in Costa Rica. In all studies, industrialized countries are found to have a
signiﬁcant impact on EM economies. For example, a study by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF 2001) shows that a 1 per cent change in G-7 growth is associated with a 0.4 per cent change
in growth in developing countries. Their results also show that a 1 per cent fall in world real
interest rates translates into a 0.3 per cent increase in the growth of developing countries.
However, most of the studies based on stylized facts focus on unconditional correlations between
different variables (e.g., output, exchange rates, and prices). In such a framework, the
unconditional correlations may be small, because they average the effects of different types of
shocks. It is therefore important to develop and estimate a structural model.
3. Empirical Framework
This section describes the empirical framework used in this study. Most previous researchers
follow the SVAR model proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).4 It is useful because it relies on
long-run restrictions that stem from economic theory. In this study, however, the short-run
dynamics are unrestricted, and therefore the empirical framework chosen differs by treating the
world aggregates as being exogenous. Consequently, EM countries have no impact on world
variables in the long run or the short run.
The empirical model permits an assessment of the importance of external shocks relative to
domestic shocks in explaining macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in EM countries. The world
aggregates are treated as being exogenous and the EM countries’ domestic variables are treated as
being endogenous. The foreign shocks are identiﬁed by a small-economy assumption. The
implication of using such a framework is that domestic variables are not allowed to affect world
aggregates in the short run or the long run. This framework is realistic because the analysis
considers EM countries.
The structural form of the model is:
, (1)
where xt is a vector of exogenous variables (i.e., world real output and interest rates), yt is a vector
of endogenous variables (i.e., domestic real output, real exchange rate, domestic prices), A0
represents the contemporaneous relations among the variables, A1 is a matrix ﬁnite-order lag
4. This methodology is also proposed by Shapiro and Watson (1988), and extended to large open
economies by Clarida and Galí (1994).
A0yt B0xt A1yt 1 – ut ++ () =4
polynomial, and ut is a vector of disturbances. The structural model is not directly estimable. The
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The following impulse responses are analyzed:
. (5)
Throughout this paper, impulse responses trace the response of current and future values of each
of the variables to a one-unit increase in the current value of the exogenous variables.
4. Data and Speciﬁcation of the Model
To analyze the sources of ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate and real per capita output in EM
countries, several speciﬁcations of the model are examined. This section describes the data used
and the speciﬁcation of the benchmark model.
4.1 Data sources
The data consist of annual observations from 1970 through 2002 for 22 EM countries: 13 Latin
American and 9 Asian economies are examined (see the country list in the appendix). Most data
series are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS): (i) domestic per capita output is
measured as GDP at 1995 prices (line 99b divided by 99bipzf)5; (ii) the real exchange rate is
calculated as the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods, proxied by the ratio






























of the CPI (line 64) divided by the product of the nominal exchange rate (line rf) and the PPI (line
63) of the United States6; the domestic price level is measured by the CPI.
The G-7 economies are used as a proxy for world aggregates. World real GDP is a sum of the G-7
economies (line 99b.czf/99birzf, converted into U.S. dollars using line rf.zf...h from the IFS). The
world interest rate is an average over the G-7 countries (treasury bill rate, line 60c).7 The time-
varying weights used in this average are based on each country’s share of real GDP in the total.
The real interest rate is obtained by subtracting CPI inﬂation from the interest rate of each of the
G-7 countries.
4.2 Time-series properties
The modelling techniques used assume that all the series are stationary, and that levels of these
series are not cointegrated. These assumptions are supported by the data. Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests are performed on all of the series8 for all of the countries in the sample, and
the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected.9 It appears, however, that the ﬁrst differences
of these series are stationary. As well, Johansen’s test of cointegration suggests that there is no
evidence of cointegration (the null hypothesis of zero cointegration vectors (r=0) is not
rejected).10
4.3 Speciﬁcation of the VAR
The shocks in the model ﬁt nicely with the transmission process in the Mundell-Fleming
framework. Therefore, the most important channels through which shocks are transmitted are
world real output and the real interest rate.
The speciﬁcation of the benchmark model is as follows. The vector of endogenous variables
includes the ﬁrst difference of the log of real per capita output as well as the ﬁrst difference of the
log of the real exchange rate for each of the 22 EM countries. Based on the Akaike Information
Criterion (Akaike 1973) and the Schwarz Criterion (Schwarz 1978), two lags of each endogenous
variable are included in the VAR. As well, the VAR includes two exogenous variables: world real
6. This consumption-based real exchange rate is used by many authors; for example, Hoffmaister and
Roldós (1997).
7. Data for Japan are from the BIS database.
8. TheseriesconsistofworldrealGDP,worldrealinterestrate,domesticrealGDP,andtherealexchange
rate.
9. There are three exceptions. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the real exchange rate is rejected for
Bangladesh, Thailand, and the Philippines. However, the same speciﬁcation will be imposed for all
countries.
10. The results are available from the author.6
output and world real interest rate. The ﬁrst differences of those series are included
contemporaneously in the model.
For each country in the sample, the benchmark model is constructed to help explain the
transmission of shocks from industrialized to EM economies. As well, to compare the way in
which EM countries respond to shocks with the way in which industrialized countries respond to
them, the same empirical framework will be used for a control group of industrialized countries
that are small open economies (Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia). This permits an
assessment of whether the response to shocks in EM countries is any different than in
industrialized small open economies; previous studies do not make this assessment.11
5. Results
This section describes the impulse-response functions (IRFs) obtained with the benchmark model
and contrasts them with the results for the control group. Different groups of countries are
compared in section 5.2; this comparison is the most promising way to understand the
discrepancies in the response of domestic variables to external shocks. A sensitivity analysis is
also performed.
5.1 Benchmark model
To assess the response of domestic variables to world shocks for different EM countries, IRFs are
used. They represent the reaction of each variable to shocks in the different equations of the
system. Across all 22 countries, the response of the domestic variables is different; no clear
pattern can be discerned. Only two general conclusions can be drawn (Figures 1 and 2). First, the
domestic variables (real per capita output and real exchange rate) respond similarly to domestic
shocks across the sample. Second, for a substantial fraction of the sample, the initial impact of a
domestic shock is larger than that of a world shock.
But the similarities across the sample end here. The conclusions regarding the propagation
mechanism following an external shock are not as obvious. There are important divergences
across the sample. As well, the EM countries analyzed demonstrate a different adjustment to
shocks than the control group of industrialized countries (see Figure 3 for the IRF of the United
Kingdom, which is representative of the industrialized country group). Indeed, the adjustment to
shocks is more erratic in EM countries. No major conclusions can be drawn regarding the
similarity of the transmission of shocks. Therefore, the particular responses of EM countries do
11. Other studies focus on industrialized countries, but, to the author’s knowledge, there has never been a
study that analyzes the transmission of shocks of industrialized and EM countries within the same
empirical framework.7
not stem only from the fact that they are small open economies: they respond differently than
industrialized small open economies. Other characteristics must explain their particular
responses.
The responses of domestic variables to world shocks vary markedly across the countries studied
(see Figures 1 and 2). Four groups of countries are studied to assess whether these differences are
a result of different economic structures (i.e., openness to trade and capital ﬂows) or a result of
differences in exchange rate regimes. Section 5.2.2 reports on this assessment; it is the most
important contribution this paper makes to the literature.
5.2 Country groupings
In an attempt to explain the discrepancies between the response of domestic variables (real output
per capita and real exchange rate) to external shocks, four groups of countries are used. First,
because the different responses could be caused by factors that are speciﬁc to the different
regional groups, this paper investigates whether the response is similar among Asian and Latin
American countries. Whether the exchange rate regime can cause the different patterns observed
across EM countries is also examined, as well as the size of each country’s trade sector and the
level of each country’s capital ﬂows.
5.2.1 Regional groups
The macroeconomic experiences of the EM countries in Latin America and Asia during the past
25 years have differed markedly. The two regions have different inﬂation rates, savings rates, and
ﬁscal responsibilities. It is therefore plausible that the different characteristics of the IRFs derive
from the dissimilarities between the two regional groups. If so, then common features should be
observed within Asian and Latin American countries as well as discrepancies between the two
regional groups.
Figures 4 and 5 show the average IRFs of Asian and Latin American countries, respectively. The
average responses between regional groups reveal important discrepancies across certain
countries, but no clear pattern is apparent within a regional group. The different responses
therefore are not caused by the different characteristics of the regional groups. Figures 4 and 5
also show that the response of domestic output to a world output shock is very similar across
regional groups. As expected, a world output shock has a positive impact on domestic output,
followed by an adjustment, and the impact dies out after six periods.
Another important feature of the model is the response of the real exchange rate to a world
interest rate shock. Across countries, there are different responses of the real exchange rate.
Dividing the sample into regional groups does not yield a good explanation for this difference. In8
many countries, there is the typical response of real depreciation following a world interest rate
shock. Indeed, following a positive world interest rate shock, the interest rate differential between
the EM countries and the world interest rate widens and capital ﬂows would be expected to move
out of the EM countries, thus causing the real exchange rate to depreciate. In some countries,
however, the reverse is observed and a real appreciation occurs. This cannot be explained on the
basis of the regional group, because there is no clear pattern among Asian or Latin American
countries.
It can therefore be concluded that regional groups do not provide a good explanation for the
differences among the EM countries for the transmission of shocks. Another potential reason for
divergence is the exchange rate regime.
5.2.2 Exchange rate  regime
To explain the divergent responses of the real exchange rate to a world interest rate shock,
exchange rate regimes are examined. To do so, the IMF’s ofﬁcial classiﬁcation of exchange rate
regimes is used, based on self-identiﬁcation by member countries.12 Ghosh et al. (1997) use the
IMF’s data to develop a different classiﬁcation scheme for 136 countries over the period from
1960 to 1990. They aggregate the nine-regime classiﬁcation scheme reported by the IMF into a
tripartite scheme where exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed as either pegged, intermediate, or
ﬂexible (Table 1). Their classiﬁcation scheme is adopted in this paper and their grouping
extended to 2002 based on IMF reports (IMF 1990–2002).
Table 1: Tripartite Classiﬁcation Scheme, Exchange Rate Regime
The countries’ exchange rate regimes are averaged over 1990–2002. The classiﬁcation for each
country is provided in the appendix.13
12. The IMFpublishes this classiﬁcation annually (IMF 1990–2002).
ER regime classiﬁcation IMF classiﬁcation
Pegged - Currency boards
- Single-currency pegs
- Basket pegs
Intermediate - Crawling pegs
- Target zones
Flexible - Floats with some intervention (but no
predetermined range for intervention)
- Pure ﬂoats
13. A country that has either an intermediate ER regime or is moving from ﬂexible to pegged, and vice
versa, would be considered in the analysis to fall under “mixed.”9
A priori, it is not clear whether the responses to shocks would be larger in a ﬁxed or in a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime. In a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate can absorb some of
the adjustment, and the variables might not have to change by as much as they would in a ﬁxed-
rate regime. On the other hand, countries that have ﬂoating exchange rates (especially if the
volatility is very high) may sometimes be regarded as more risky than those that have credible
pegs.
Hoffmaister, Roldós, and Wickham (1997) examine the sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in
sub-Saharan African countries14 and ﬁnd that external shocks appear to have a greater inﬂuence
on ﬂuctuations of output and the real exchange rate in ﬁxed exchange rate regime countries,
because  the exchange rate does not (partially) buffer those countries from external shocks.
It is found that the type of exchange rate regime is a critical determinant for the transmission of
external shocks. Indeed, the ﬁnding described in section 5.2.1, that some countries experience a
real appreciation following a world real interest rate shock, can be better understood when
considering the exchange rate regime. As Figure 6 shows, countries classiﬁed as having a ﬂexible
exchange rate exhibit an expected real depreciation when the world real interest rate increases.
Countries under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, however, have a counterintuitive response: they
experience a real appreciation.
The model shows that, if a country is under a ﬁxed exchange rate, or if it is considered as having
an intermediate exchange rate regime, it will experience a real appreciation following a world
interest rate shock. The reason for this counterintuitive reaction is that, since the exchange rate is
ﬁxed, the adjustment must come through prices. Consistent with the Mundell-Fleming
framework, a world interest rate shock would result in a decline in the domestic price level, as
well as a fall in the foreign price level.
Many authors (Agénor and Aizenman 1999, among others) who hypothesize that there are
important nominal rigidities in EM countries report numerous distortions and a dualism in the
labour market in those countries. This suggests that the domestic price level does not move
instantaneously in response to unanticipated disturbances, but adjusts slowly over time. It is
therefore possible for the currency to experience a real appreciation, as observed for countries that
have a ﬁxed exchange rate or an intermediate exchange rate regime.15
14. Hoffmaister, Roldós, and Wickham (1997) compare the CFA franc countries with the non-CFA franc
countries.
15. This could also reﬂect other factors, such as the nominal exchange rate adjustment with respect to
third countries.10
In addition, the model suggests that countries under a ﬁxed or a ﬂexible exchange rate regime are
less vulnerable following a world real output shock than countries under an intermediate regime.
A ﬂexible exchange rate acts as a shock absorber (Figure 7), as expected, since the initial impact
and the response of domestic output is rather small. The same is observed for the ﬁxed exchange
rate: those countries are more protected from shocks. It can therefore be concluded that a country
is more vulnerable to external shocks when it is not at either end of the exchange rate regime
spectrum. It is possible, however, that this result occurs because of self-selection, since inherently
unstable countries cannot maintain exchange rate regimes at either end of the spectrum. Countries
at both ends of the spectrum are therefore more stable by deﬁnition.
5.2.3 The size of the trade sector
A third country grouping is considered. The hypothesis to be tested is simple: the more open a
country is, the more it should react to foreign variables. Countries that are more open are therefore
expected to react more to external shocks. To assess this possibility, countries are divided into two
groups: “most” and “least” open. The measure of trade openness is a standard openness ratio
(ratio of imports and exports to GDP16). If the ratio is higher than the median, the country is
considered to be in the more open group. Otherwise, it is considered to be in the least open group.
First, the response of domestic output following an external output shock is examined. As
Figure 8 shows, trade openness does not affect the transmission of the shock. Whether the country
is in the more or the least open group, the dynamics are the same: a positive world output shock
has a positive impact on EM countries.
Figure 9 shows that trade plays a role in the response of the real exchange rate to a world interest
rate shock. Indeed, on average, a country that is more open will have the response described in
section 5.2.2 (real depreciation), whereas countries that are relatively closed will experience a
counterintuitive response (real appreciation). This supports the hypothesis given in section 5.2.2.
Most countries that have a ﬁxed exchange rate regime and that experience a real exchange rate
appreciation are relatively closed.17 This reinforces the explanation for the nominal price
rigidities, because those countries do not face as much competition through trade.
16. Data on trade are taken from the IFS, line70..dzf and 71..dzf.
17. Examples of such countries are Argentina and Bangladesh.11
5.2.4 Capital ﬂows
The premise of the capital ﬂows grouping is that, if a country has a low level of capital ﬂows
across its borders, it will be less affected by world interest rate shocks. To assess this premise, a
measure of gross capital ﬂows to GDP is used.18
As Figure 10 shows, countries that have restricted capital ﬂows initially react less to a world
interest rate shock. Low capital mobility dampens the effect of the foreign shock to the asset
markets. This result suggests that, as expected, ﬁnancial linkages are more important, in terms of
transmission of business cycles, for economies that are more open to capital ﬂows. Figure 11
shows that the initial impact of a world output shock on domestic output is smaller for a country
that has a low level of capital ﬂows.
The results are in line with stylized facts that, if world interest rates rise after a period of low
levels of interest rates and abundant liquidity, countries that have a high level of capital ﬂows are
more vulnerable to capital outﬂows as interest rates in industrialized countries rise. It is therefore
consistent with what is observed in the sample that the impact on domestic output is more
negative for countries that have more open capital accounts.
Furthermore, it is found that the level of development plays a role in explaining the transmission
of shocks. The results show that countries that have higher levels of real GDP per capita are
affected negatively by a world interest rate shock, whereas countries that have lower real GDP per
capita are affected positively. Countries that have higher levels of development have better-
functioning ﬁnancial systems and therefore borrow more on international capital markets.
Although the increase in world interest rates diminishes the relative attractiveness of EM bonds
and increases the cost of borrowing, a recovery in industrialized countries also affects emerging
markets through the trade channel (resulting from stronger growth in industrialized countries).
These offsetting effects will have different impacts on different countries. The results show that,
following a world interest rate shock, countries that have higher levels of real GDP per capita are
affected more by the ﬁnancial channel, and countries that have lower real GDP per capita are
affected more by the trade channel.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of the benchmark model, a sensitivity analysis is performed. The results
show that the model is robust to different speciﬁcations. For example, when a ﬁfth variable is
added to the model (domestic prices), the results described in sections 5.1 and 5.2 still hold.
18. Data on gross capital ﬂows are taken from the World Bank database (line bg.kac.fnei.gd.zs).12
Different world aggregates are also considered. World output, as proxied by the G-7 economies, is
replaced by U.S. real output, and the U.S. federal funds rate is substituted in place of the world
interest rate shock. The adjustment pattern is, in most cases, the same, but the response is higher
following a U.S. shock than following a G-7 shock.
6. Conclusion
The study of co-movement is important because its results can guide policy in an era of
accelerating globalization. As the latest slowdown of the world economy has demonstrated,
business cycles are transmitted across countries. This paper has identiﬁed channels of business
cycle transmission to evaluate the extent to which economic ﬂuctuations in the EM countries are
caused by shocks that originate in industrialized countries.
The sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in EM countries (focusing on Asia and Latin
America) have been documented and the relative importance of domestic versus external shocks
has been measured. Consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model, two speciﬁc shocks were
measured that could be transmitted from one country to another: a world real output shock and a
world real interest rate shock. The analysis has helped explain the relative importance of the
different shocks that drive output and real exchange rate ﬂuctuations in EM countries.
The results obtained show that there are major differences in the transmission mechanism across
different EM countries. To assess whether the discrepancies in the transmission of shocks is due
to different economic structures or to the exchange rate regime, a sample of 22 EM coutries has
been divided into groups, based on the region to which a country belongs, its openness to trade, its
exchange rate regime, and its capital ﬂows. The results indicate that the exchange regime is a
critical factor, although the restrictions on capital ﬂows also play a crucial role. It has also been
shown that the role played by regional groups and trade openness is not as important in
determining the transmission of business cycles. When the impact of external shocks on real
output and the real exchange rate for EM countries is analyzed, exchange rate regimes as well as
restrictions on capital ﬂows that exist in those countries should be the two major factors
considered.
This paper has provided a number of preliminary results. Other, more detailed models could be
used to further explain the transmission of business cycles, in order to help policy-makers design
improved macroeconomic policies in an increasingly integrated world economy.13
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Figure 7: Exchange Rate Regimes: Response of Domestic Output

















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
shock to world output





















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
shock to world output

















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
shock to world output

















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
shock to world output



















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
shock to world output
Least Open, Response of Domestic Output21
Figure 9: Trade Sector: Response of the Real Exchange Rate
Figure 10: Capital Flows Sector: Response of Domestic Output
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Argentina Latin America Least open More ﬂows Pegged
Brazil Latin America Least open Less ﬂows Mixed
Chile Latin America Most open More ﬂows Mixed
Colombia Latin America Least open Less ﬂows Mixed
Costa Rica Latin America Most open Less ﬂows Mixed
Dominican Republic Latin America Most open Less ﬂows Flexible
Ecuador Latin America Most open More ﬂows Pegged
El Salvador Latin America Least open Less ﬂows Mixed
Guatemala Latin America Least open More ﬂows Flexible
Mexico Latin America Most open Less ﬂows Flexible
Peru Latin America Least open Less ﬂows Flexible
Uruguay Latin America Least open More ﬂows Mixed
Venezuela Latin America Most open More ﬂows Mixed
Bangladesh Asia Least open Less ﬂows Pegged
India Asia Least open Less ﬂows Flexible
Indonesia Asia Most open Less ﬂows Flexible
Malaysia Asia Most open More ﬂows Pegged
Pakistan Asia Least open Less ﬂows Flexible
Philippines Asia Most open More ﬂows Flexible
Singapore Asia Most open More ﬂows Flexible
Sri Lanka Asia Most open More ﬂows Flexible
Thailand Asia Most open More ﬂows MixedBank of Canada Working Papers
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